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WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
ROPER’S DILEMMA FOR ADOLESCENT 
HEALTH LAW? 
Jennifer Rosato 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Adolescents engage in adult activities: they have sex,1 they 
sext each other,2 they get pregnant,3 they get abortions,4 and they 
                                                          
 Dean and Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law. I 
would like to acknowledge the hard work of my research assistants David 
Stock and Kehinde Durowade, and my administrative assistant Tita Kaus. 
Thanks to Professor Juan Perea for thoughtfully reading an earlier version of 
the Essay and his constant support. Additional thanks to John Austin, Ben 
Carlson, and the library staff for their able assistance. I am particularly 
grateful to Karen Porter and Brooklyn Law School for giving me the chance 
to present at the Adolescents in Society Symposium, and submit this Essay to 
the Journal of Law and Policy. Finally, thanks to the editorial staff of the 
Journal for their accommodations and helpful comments, which improved the 
piece. 
1 See, e.g., Facts on American Teens’ Sexual and Reproductive Health, 
IN BRIEF (Guttmacher Inst., New York, N.Y.), Aug.  2011  [hereinafter 
Facts], available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-ATSRH.pdf. Like 
adults, teens also get sexually transmitted diseases. See STDs in Adolescents 
and Young Adults, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/STD/stats09/adol.htm (last updated Nov. 22, 2010). 
2 See, e.g., Dionne Searcey, A Lawyer, Some Teens, and a Fight over 
‘Sexting,’ WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2009, at A17; Riva Richmond, Sexting May 
Place Teens at Legal Risk, N.Y. TIMES GADGETWISE BLOG (Mar. 26, 2009, 
12:00 PM), http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/sexting-may-
place-teens-at-legal-risk. 
3 See GUTTMACHER INST., U.S. TEENAGE PREGNANCIES, BIRTHS AND 
ABORTIONS: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS AND TRENDS BY RACE AND 
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refuse life-sustaining treatment (among a myriad of adult 
activities).5 But just because they do engage in these activities 
does not mean that they should. Courts, psychologists, and legal 
academics have grappled with one of the overarching questions 
addressed by the Adolescents in Society Symposium: to what 
extent should law and policy treat teenagers differently from 
adults? 
This question cannot be answered without first understanding 
the underlying bases for treating them differently. One basis is 
the “commonsense reality”6 that children are different than 
adults. In the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the majority relied on “the settled 
understanding that the differentiating characteristics of youth are 
universal”7 in reaching its conclusion that age should be 
considered a factor in the determination whether a suspect is in 
custody for purposes of providing Miranda warnings. 
Specifically, the Court pointed to the “objective conclusions . . . 
that children are more susceptible to influence” and “outside 
pressures.”8  
                                                          
ETHNICITY (2010) [hereinafter U.S. TEENAGE PREGNANCIES], available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/USTPtrends.pdf; see also Facts, supra note 
1 (citing statistics that each year almost 750,000 U.S. women aged fifteen to 
nineteen become pregnant, and that in 2006 that number represented seventy-
two women per 1,000).  
4 U.S. TEENAGE PREGNANCIES, supra note 3.  
5 See cases discussed in Jennifer Rosato, The Ultimate Test of Autonomy: 
Should Minors Have a Right to Make Decisions Regarding Life-Sustaining 
Treatment, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 4–8 (1996) [hereinafter Rosato, The 
Ultimate Test of Autonomy] (describing instances in which minors refused 
medical treatment). See generally Laurence Steinberg, Risk Taking in 
Adolescence: New Perspectives from Brain and Behavioral Science, 16 
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 55, 58 (2007) [hereinafter 
Steinberger, Risk Taking] (“More than 90% of all American high school 
students have had sex, drug, and driver education in their schools, yet large 
proportions of them still have unsafe sex, binge drink, smoke cigarettes, and 
drive recklessly (often more than one of these at the same time.”)).  
6 This term was used by the majority in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 
S. Ct. 2394, 2398 (2011). 
7 Id. at 2403–04. 
8 Id. 
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Recent neuroscience research, or “brain science,” offers 
another basis for treating adolescents differently.  These findings 
support the “commonsense reality” that adolescents are 
unpredictable, reckless, and impulsive. This research has 
identified a number of significant changes in the brain that occur 
through adolescence and into the mid-twenties. Those well-
documented changes include decrease in the grey matter in the 
brain; increase in the white matter in the prefrontal regions of 
the brain; changes in the numbers and distribution of dopamine 
receptors (“dopaminergic activity”); and more connections 
among different areas of the brain.9 
Although teens’ behavior is consistent with the neurological 
changes documented in this research, some teenagers are capable 
of making some decisions, especially as they approach the age 
of majority.10 The vexing question now facing advocates for 
children’s rights is how to use this neuroscience literature (if at 
all) in guiding public policy and supporting greater autonomy for 
adolescents.11 
This Essay addresses how this literature should inform the 
law relating to health care decisions that need to be made by or 
for adolescents—from birth control to refusal of life-sustaining 
                                                          
9 See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain 
Development Inform Public Policy?, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 739, 742–43 
(2009) [hereinafter Steinberg, Public Policy]; see also Laurence Steinberg, 
Commentary: A Behavioral Scientist Looks at the Science of Adolescent Brain 
Development, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 160, 161 (2010). See generally 
DANIEL R. WEINBERGER ET AL., THE NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN 
PREGNANCY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN: A WORK IN PROGRESS (2005), 
available at http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/resources/pdf/BRAIN.pdf 
(describing how advances in neuroscience and imaging are altering scientific 
perceptions of adolescent cognition).  
10 See Steinberg, Public Policy, supra note 9, at 744; Laurence Steinberg 
et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults? Minors’ Access to Abortion, 
the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 592 (2009) [hereinafter Steinberg, Flip-Flop]; see also 
studies cited infra Part III. 
11 See Steinberg, Public Policy, supra note 9, at 745–48; Steinberg, Flip-
Flop, supra note 10, at 592–93. 
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treatment.12 Recent cases integrating the neuroscience literature, 
primarily in the criminal law context, have embraced the view 
of adolescents as vulnerable, incapable of considering long-term 
consequences, and in need of protection.13 This view creates a 
dilemma for those policymakers and advocates, like myself, who 
consider adolescents mature or “adult-like” outside of the 
context of these criminal law cases. This dilemma is not simply 
an abstract one. It may affect adolescents’ ability to participate 
in decisions as important as whether they should be able to get 
the Human Papillomavirus (“HPV”) vaccine;14 decline genetic 
testing for late-onset diseases;15 obtain treatment for mental 
                                                          
12 I addressed the issue of health care decision making by adolescents and 
the relevance of the existing evidence on capacity in Jennifer L. Rosato, Let’s 
Get Real: Quilting a Principled Approach to Adolescent Empowerment in 
Health Care Decision-Making, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 769 (2002) [hereinafter 
Rosato, Let’s Get Real]. Other authors who have written thoughtfully on this 
issue include Rhonda Gay Hartman, Coming of Age: Devising Legislation for 
Adolescent Medical Decision-Making, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 409 (2002) 
[hereinafter Hartman, Coming of Age], and Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Whose 
Body Is It Anyway? An Updated Model of Health Care Decision-Making, 14 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 251 (2005) [hereinafter Mutcherson, Whose 
Body].  
13 See infra Part II. 
14 See, e.g., Carol A. Ford et al., Increasing Adolescent Vaccination: 
Barriers and Strategies in the Context of Policy, Legal, and Financial Issues, 
44 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 568, 570 (2009); Abigail English et al., Legal 
Basis of Consent for Health Care and Vaccination for Adolescents, 121 
PEDIATRICS (SUPPLEMENT 1) S85, S87 (2008); Ruth M. Farrell & Ellen S. 
Rome, Adolescents’ Access and Consent to the Human Papillomavirus 
Vaccine: A Critical Aspect for Immunization Success, 120 PEDIATRICS 434, 
435 (2007). The HPV vaccine prevents the onset of many cervical cancers 
caused by the human papillomavirus. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & 
Prevention, Quadrivalent Human Papillomavirus Vaccine, Recommendations 
of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 56 MORBIDITY 
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1256, 1256 (2007). 
15 Late-onset diseases are those that would arise during adulthood, such 
as breast cancer or Alzheimer’s disease. See Am. Coll. of Med. Genetics, 
Points to Consider: Ethical Legal and Psychosocial Implications of Genetic 
Testing in Children and Adolescents, 57 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1233, 1233 
(1995). See generally Rosamond Rhodes, Why Test Children for Adult-Onset 
Genetic Diseases?, 73 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 609 (2006) (arguing that 
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health problems;16 consent to participation in research trials;17 or 
elect treatment to change gender identity.18  
This Essay grapples with this problem in the context of health 
care decision making by adolescents and concludes that core values 
underlying public policies, not science, ultimately will help resolve 
this dilemma.19 First, the Essay summarizes the existing law related 
to health care decision making, which (with few exceptions) 
considers the adolescent as a child, incapable of making these 
decisions on his or her own. Second, the Essay discusses what 
effect the neuroscience literature should have on the development 
of this area of law. Third, the Essay advocates for the adoption of 
a “contextual capacity” determination, which would allow some 
mature minors to make health care decisions in areas justified by 
compelling public policies. These policies will allow a more 
principled and nuanced doctrine to develop that respects the 
capacity and dignity of these minors as science continues to 
“inform,” but not “dictate,” public policy in this area.20 
                                                          
consensus against predictive testing of children for adult onset genetic 
conditions is not justified).   
16 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124260 (West Supp. 2011) 
(allowing mature minors twelve years and older to consent to outpatient 
treatment). 
17 See generally INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD., THE ETHICAL 
CONDUCT OF CLINICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN (Marilyn J. Field & 
Richard E. Behrman eds., 2004); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Word from the 
Academies: A Primer for Legal Policy Analysis Regarding Adolescent 
Research Participation, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 151 (2006) 
[hereinafter Hartman, Word from the Academies] (both advocating greater 
participation by adolescents in research). 
18 See, e.g., Maureen Carroll, Comment, Transgender Youth, Adolescent 
Decisionmaking, and Roper v. Simmons, 56 UCLA L. REV. 725, 725 
(2009); see also Cara D. Watts, Asking Adolescents: Does a Mature Minor 
Have a Right to Participate in Health Care Decisions?, 16 HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S L.J. 221, 223 (2005). 
19 Other commentators have recognized this dilemma. See Kimberly M. 
Mutcherson, Minor Discrepancies: Forging a Common Understanding of 
Adolescent Competence in Healthcare Decision-Making and Criminal 
Responsibility, 6 NEV. L.J. 927, 927–99 (2006) [hereinafter Mutcherson, 
Minor Discrepancies]; see also Carroll, supra note 18, at 726–29. 
20 Steinberg, Public Policy, supra note 9, at 746.  
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II. THE ROPER DECISION POSES THE DILEMMA 
In recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has 
concluded that juveniles differ from adults and therefore should 
be treated differently. Most notably, in Roper v. Simmons, the 
Court concluded that imposing the death penalty on juveniles 
was unconstitutional as a violation of the Eighth Amendment.21 
Prior to this decision, the Court had permitted execution of 
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.22 In reaching its conclusion that 
imposing the death penalty on any person under eighteen was 
unconstitutional, the Court relied on a number of authorities: 
precedent prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons, 
the record of states that had abolished the death penalty for 
juveniles, international norms prohibiting the juvenile death 
penalty, and the differences between adults and juveniles.23 
The Court identified three areas of difference between 
juveniles and adults that justified the differential treatment. First, 
their lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility 
leads to greater recklessness and more impulsivity than adults.24 
Second, they are more vulnerable and subject to pressures 
(particularly peer pressure).25 Third, the character of the juvenile 
is not yet well-formed.26 The Roper Court referred to 
neuroscience research in reaching its conclusion that juveniles 
were different from adults. The Court, drawing upon what “any 
parent knows and . . . the scientific and sociological studies 
respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm,” found that “[a] 
lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility 
are found in youth more often than in adults . . . .”27  
This neuroscience research was relied upon even more 
                                                          
21 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). 
22 Id. at 562. 
23 Id. at 563–78.  
24 Id. at 569. 
25 Id.  
26 Id. at 570. 
27 Id. at 569 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 
350, 367 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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explicitly in Graham v. Florida,28 in which the Court held that 
imposing a life sentence without parole on a juvenile who had 
not committed homicide was a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.29 Reinforcing Roper’s conclusions regarding 
juvenile incompetence, the Graham Court stated, “developments 
in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental 
differences between juvenile and adult minds.”30 Most recently, 
in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court acknowledged that 
“social science and cognitive science authorities” supported its 
conclusion to consider age in the Miranda custody analysis, 
although the acknowledgment was not necessary to the Court’s 
disposition.31 
Roper and its progeny have created a dilemma: can 
adolescents be considered immature for some purposes, yet 
mature for others? This dilemma was highlighted by Justice 
Scalia in his dissent in Roper, in which he pointed out that the 
American Psychological Association (“APA”) had taken what he 
perceived to be the “opposite position” in cases involving 
abortion rights: in that context, the APA, in its amicus brief, 
provided scientific evidence that persons under eighteen are 
capable of making decisions regarding abortion.32 Justice Scalia 
admonished the majority for “picking and choosing the studies 
that support its position.”33 
Justice Scalia’s perspective underscores the vexing and 
important dilemma posed by the Roper decision: considering the 
brain science research, is it possible under the law to consider 
children incapable for some purposes—such as punishment under 
the criminal law—and capable for others—such as medical 
decision making? 
Scholars and policymakers who have consistently advocated 
for greater autonomy for adolescents making health care 
                                                          
28 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
29 Id. at 2030. 
30 Id. at 2026.  
31 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 n.5 (2011). 
32 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
33 Id. (alteration in original). 
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decisions34 should be more than a bit concerned about the 
implications of Roper and its progeny. Although it is 
encouraging that the Court appears to be integrating scientific 
literature into its decisions in a more thoughtful way,35 these 
decisions have made it more difficult to support adolescents as 
mature or “adult-like” outside of the context of these cases.36 
This difficulty is exacerbated by the existing law, which 
provides little protection for children’s autonomy—particularly in 
the health care area. 
III. THE EXISTING LAW RELATED TO HEALTH CARE DECISION 
MAKING: THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, THE MORE THE LAW 
STAYS THE SAME 
The law related to health care decision making, with a few 
limited exceptions, treats adolescents as children: vulnerable, 
incapable, and in need of protection from their parents.37 
Therefore, parents make most minor and major health care 
decisions on behalf of their children.38 
A few exceptions do exist. Minors may make autonomous 
decisions related to the choice whether to have an abortion, an 
area protected by federal constitutional law.39 A minor is able to 
                                                          
34 I have been one of those advocates in my prior scholarship. See 
generally Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12; see also Jennifer Rosato, 
The Ethics of Clinical Trials: A Child’s View, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 362 
(2000) [hereinafter Rosato, The Ethics of Clinical Trials]; Rosato, The 
Ultimate Test of Autonomy, supra note 5. 
35 I have previously criticized the Court for making conclusions relating 
to children’s development without relying on the existing scientific or 
psychological literature. See Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 783–
84. 
36 See Mutcherson, Minor Discrepancies, supra note 19, at 935–53; 
Steinberg, Flip-Flop, supra note 10, at 583–85, for a discussion of the 
difficulties presented by alternating conceptions of adolescent decision making 
abilities. 
37 See infra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
38 See Mutcherson, Whose Body, supra note 12, at 259–63; see also 
Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 771–72. 
39 See Rachel Rebouche, Parental Involvement Laws and New 
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obtain an abortion without parental consent or permission if she 
is able to demonstrate to a judge that she is mature or the 
abortion is in her best interest.40 Other exceptions to parental 
control of health care decisions are narrow and vary state-by-
state.41 In most states, minors can make decisions based on their 
maturity (a “mature minor doctrine”) only in the abortion 
context. Some states allow minors to consent when adolescents 
achieve a certain status, such as when minors are emancipated 
or married.42 Some also allow minors to consent when public 
policy (or public health) warrants, such as allowing minors to 
consent to treatment of sexually transmitted and other reportable 
diseases, care related to drug and alcohol use, and outpatient 
mental health services.43 In other areas of health care decision 
making, most states do not have laws that protect a minor’s 
ability to make a health care decision based on his or her 
maturity.44 Moreover, even states recognizing a mature minor 
doctrine may limit that right in some significant way by, for 
example, extending decision making to consent but not 
necessarily refusal of treatment (including life-sustaining 
treatment);45 imposing conditions such as those related to 
                                                          
Governance, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 175, 179–88 (2011). 
40 See Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass 
Hearings, and the Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 429–32 
(2009); see also Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, STATE POLICIES 
IN BRIEF (Guttmacher Inst., New York, N.Y.), Sept. 1, 2011, available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PIMA.pdf. 
41 See Amy T. Campbell, State Regulation of Medical Research with 
Children and Adolescents: An Overview and Analysis, in ETHICAL CONDUCT 
OF CLINICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN, supra note 17, at app. B at 
324.    
42 See Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 776–78; see also 
ABIGAIL ENGLISH ET AL., STATE MINOR CONSENT LAWS: A SUMMARY 3–4 
(3d ed. 2010).  
43 See ENGLISH, supra note 42, at 4–6. 
44 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8-4 (2006); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6922 
(West 2004); OR. REV. STAT. ANN § 109.640 (West Supp. 2011); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 63-5-340 (2010); see also Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 
779–81. See generally Campbell, supra note 41, app. B at 347–52 tbl.B.4; 
ENGLISH, supra note 42, at 3–6. 
45 See Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 779–81. 
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financial independence and other indicia of emancipation;46 
limiting the doctrine to a particular context;47 or requiring 
parental participation.48 
The reasons undergirding this protective view of children in 
the health care context were articulated decades before the 
recent adolescent neuroscience research was conducted. In 
Bellotti v. Baird,49 decided by the United States Supreme Court 
in 1979, the plurality reasoned that children should be treated 
differently because of “the peculiar vulnerability of children; 
their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature 
manner; and the importance of the parental role in child 
rearing.”50 
An ever-growing body of neuroscience research supports this 
differential treatment, even of older adolescents. According to 
this research, the adolescent brain functions differently from the 
adult brain in important respects, including long-range planning, 
risk assessment, and complex decision making involving emotion 
and cognition.51 Thus far this research seems to be accepted by 
                                                          
46 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6922 (West 2004); see also Campbell, supra 
note 41, app. B at 325, 347–52 tbl.B.4 (citing states that include 
emancipation criteria). 
47 See Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 780. 
48 See id. at 780–81. 
49 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion). 
50 Id. at 634; see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) 
(“[P]arents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for 
judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions . . . . [P]arents . . . act 
in the best interests of their children.”). 
51 See, e.g., WEINBERGER ET AL., supra note 9, at 13–19; Laurence 
Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Development in Adolescence, 9 TRENDS 
COGNITIVE SCI. 69, 69–71 (2005) [hereinafter Steinberg, Cognitive 
Development]; Steinberg, Public Policy, supra note 9, at 743–44; Steinberg, 
Risk Taking, supra note 5. Additional research continues to explore the 
differences between adolescents and adults in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., 
Eveline A. Crone et al., Developmental Changes and Individual Differences 
in Risk and Perspective-Taking in Adolescence, 20 DEV. & 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 1213 (2008); Bonnie L. Halpern-Felsher & Elizabeth 
Cauffman, Costs and Benefits of a Decision: Decision-Making Competence in 
Adolescents and Adults, 22 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 257 
(2001); Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A 
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courts, based on holdings that have allowed adolescents to be 
treated differently in the criminal justice system.52  
At the same time, the existence and credibility of the 
neuroscience research has created a dilemma for those who 
advocate for greater autonomy for children in other areas, 
including health care. If the neuroscience research “carries 
over” to this context, it would make it difficult to argue that 
older adolescents possess the autonomy to make certain health 
care decisions. Roper’s Dilemma seems difficult to resolve.53  
IV. ROPER’S DILEMMA FOR HEALTH CARE DECISION MAKING: 
CAN A CHILD BE TREATED AS A CHILD FOR ONE PURPOSE AND 
AN ADULT FOR ANOTHER?  
Researchers have been studying the maturity of adolescents 
in a number of different contexts,54 and their findings suggest 
that Roper’s dilemma can be resolved. At least one group of 
                                                          
Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (2003); Berna Güroglu et al., Fairness 
Considerations: Increasing Understanding of Intentionality During 
Adolescence, 104 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 398 (2009); Anna C.K. 
van Duijvenvoorde, Affective and Cognitive Decision-Making in Adolescents, 
35 DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 539 (2010). 
52 See discussion supra Part II.  
53 This dilemma may extend into young adulthood as the law’s view of 
adolescence (and whether minors are capable) may be increasingly affected 
by the greater dependency of young adults on their parents in their early and 
mid-twenties. See AFL-CIO WORKING AMERICA, YOUNG WORKERS: A LOST 
DECADE 15 (2009); Rich Morin & Wendy Wang, Home for the 
Holidays . . . and Every Other Day, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 24, 2009), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2009/11/24/home-for-the-holidays-and-every-
other-day/; cf. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. 300gg-
14 (West 2006 & Supp. 3 2009) (requiring covering of young adults under 
parents’ health insurance until age 26). This demographic shift not only has 
the potential of affecting the overall view of adolescents in society, but also 
may diminish their actual decision making capacities, since the 
“commonsense reality” is that they probably have had less chance to exercise 
their decision making skills before reaching young adulthood. 
54 Steinberg, Flip-Flop, supra note 10, at 585–86, 593; see also studies 
cited supra note 51. 
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researchers has concluded that, because adolescents’ capacity to 
make decisions varies for different types of decisions, it is 
consistent to conclude that adolescents can be deemed incapable 
in the Roper and Graham contexts, yet considered capable of 
making health care decisions.55 Consequently, in their view, the 
APA is not “flip flopping” when it simultaneously advocates 
both views of adolescents.56 
Based on empirical evidence, these researchers have 
distinguished those decisions “that allow for unhurried, logical 
reflection and those that do not.”57 Medical decisions fall into 
this first category, as well as decisions to participate in clinical 
research. As to these kinds of decisions, 
where emotional and social influences on judgment are 
minimized or can be mitigated, and where there are 
consultants who can provide objective information about the 
costs and benefits of alternative courses of action, 
adolescents are likely to be just as capable of mature 
decision making as adults, at least by the time they are 16.58  
The researchers conclude that these decisions are primarily 
cognitive or intellectual in nature, rather than psychosocial.59 
In reaching their conclusions, these researchers emphasize that 
science should “inform” rather than “dictate” public policy.60 They 
remind judges and advocates (among others) that one competency 
standard does not necessarily fit all adolescents, and therefore these 
professionals should engage in “a careful and nuanced 
consideration of the particular demands placed on the individual for 
‘adult-like’ maturity in different domains of functioning.”61 These 
findings are consistent with an earlier body of research supporting 
the capacity of older adolescents to make health care decisions.62  
                                                          
55 Steinberg, Flip-Flip, supra note 10, at 586–87, 592–93. 
56 Id. at 592–93. 
57 Id. at 592. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. at 586–87, 592–93. 
60 Id. at 593.  
61 Id. 
62 See Hartman, Word from the Academies, supra note 17, at 174 & 
nn.119–23, 176 & nn.128 & 131–32 (concluding that adolescents may be 
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Professionals dealing with these issues need to look beyond 
the existing research and consider giving mature minors the right 
to make certain health care decisions, depending on the context 
in which the decision is made and the competing values 
underlying the public policies at stake. The individual variations 
in maturity also should be taken into account in the mature 
minor determination, which more broadly acknowledges the 
volatility and transitional nature of adolescence.  
V. MOVING TOWARDS “CONTEXTUAL CAPACITY” 
Ultimately, the existing scientific evidence does not (yet) 
provide a useful guide for determining whether the law should 
recognize that some minors are able to make decisions in the 
health care context. Although researchers and commentators 
have concluded that such decisions are different from those 
facing the juveniles in the Roper and Graham cases,63 this 
distinction is not entirely convincing. Some health care decisions 
are made with “unhurried, logical reflection”64 but others are 
not. Many minors do not consult adults in making these 
decisions, but others will.65 Sometimes minors use their 
cognitive abilities in making these decisions, and sometimes they 
are guided by psychosocial considerations.66 Teenagers may not 
                                                          
competent to consent to research, although more study is necessary); Rosato, 
Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 784–85; see also Brief for Amicus Curiae 
American Psychological Association in Support of Appellees and Cross-
Appellants at 6–10, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988) 
(No. 86-5423-MN/No. 86-5431-MN), available at http://www.apa.org 
/about/offices/ogc/amicus/hodgson.pdf. 
63 See supra Part II; see also Mutcherson, Minor Discrepancies, supra 
note 19, at 952–65. 
64 Steinberg, Flip-Flop, supra note 10, at 592. 
65 See id. at 586 (pointing to studies indicating that approximately half of 
pregnant girls contemplating an abortion do not consult their parents, but do 
consult with a nonparental adult other than medical staff).  
66 For example, it is possible that teen girls sometimes have babies so 
that they will be loved unconditionally or so a boyfriend will stay with them, 
and some teens may refuse treatment because of how it will make them look 
or to allow them to keep up with their friends. See generally Amanda 
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be deliberative in the ways that the researchers assume, and 
although some teens are deliberative, others may not be.  
More research into neurology and developmental psychology 
is needed to provide greater reliability and predictability as to 
what capacities are needed for particular decisions.67 This 
knowledge will give judges and advocates a better sense of 
whether the view of adolescents as incapable in Roper and 
Graham should carry over to other areas.  
However, even additional scientific evidence may not help 
resolve individual cases: consequently, the type of health care 
decision and its context will remain important to determining 
whether a minor is mature enough to make a particular decision 
at a certain time and place.68 Health care decisions range from 
abortion, to life-sustaining treatment, vaccinations, antibiotics, 
and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases. Participation in 
clinical research is similar to a health care decision, as related 
considerations are weighed: the primary distinction is that the 
objective of research is to advance knowledge to help others 
rather than to improve the individual patient’s health.69 Some of 
these decisions require a simple risk/benefit analysis regarding 
the efficacy and safety of a particular treatment, but others 
require the teenager to grapple with value-laden issues such as 
determining the quality of one’s life as a terminally/chronically 
ill child, or taking on the major responsibilities of single 
parenthood before finishing high school. 
                                                          
Memrick, Surprising Reasons Teens Say They Get Pregnant, GASTON 
GAZETTE (May 8, 2010, 12:19 PM), http://www.gastongazette.com/ 
articles/teens-46910-pregnant-information.html. 
67 More studies are being conducted to test capacity in particular 
contexts. See studies cited supra note 51. 
68 See Hartman, Coming of Age, supra note 12; Mutcherson, Whose 
Body, supra note 12; Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 795; 
Steinberg, Public Policy, supra note 9, at 747–48.    
69 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2010) (defining “research”); see also 
Hartman, Word from the Academies, supra note 17, at 157–58 & nn.31–32 
(“Underlying those regulatory protections for children are bifurcated aims of 
safeguarding minors’ best interests while yielding generalized knowledge 
about drug therapies and other medical treatments beneficial to younger age 
groups.”). 
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All of these reasons lead me to a conclusion that I reached 
ten years ago, and of which I have become even more convinced 
post-Roper: that mature minors should be able to make some 
important health care decisions.70 Specifically, a contextual 
capacity doctrine would allow a health care provider to assess 
the minor’s maturity and, if appropriate, agree to the minor’s 
decision without parental permission or consent.71 This approach 
should be privatized, in the sense that it would not require court 
intervention in most circumstances.72 For some decisions, such 
as refusal of life-sustaining treatment, the court may retain a 
limited role as a “safety net” to ensure that the adolescent’s 
decision would not threaten his or her life or cause permanent 
physical harm.73 
Although the limits of this Essay do not allow development 
of a detailed approach, it is important to set forth the compelling 
public policies that should guide this inquiry and inform 
different outcomes depending on the context. One guiding 
ethical principle in the health care context is the protection of 
the mature minor’s autonomy and bodily integrity. Other 
compelling policies in this context include: identity formation, 
promoting moral development, parity, and public health. 
Consideration of these policies will enable law and policy to 
move in a direction that is more principled and coherent.  
A. Identity Formation 
Where a decision impacts a minor’s formation of his or her 
identity, a mature minor should be able to decide on his or her 
                                                          
70 Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 797–803; Rosato, The 
Ultimate Test of Autonomy, supra note 5, at 83–103. 
71 See Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 795–803. Although this 
approach varies somewhat from the “categorical, contextual” approach I 
proposed in 2002, it seems more feasible, practical, and consistent with the 
current cultural, legal, and ethical environment. 
72 But see Sanger, supra note 40, at 461–63 (criticizing the determination 
of maturity by the courts in the abortion context). 
73 Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 799–800. 
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own.74 Some decisions, such as whether to choose to have an 
abortion or have a child, the refusal of life-sustaining treatment, 
or a gender identity change are major life decisions implicating 
core values that will affect the quality of a minor’s entire life. 
The decision whether to have an abortion or have a child is a 
decision to take on the life-long responsibilities of a parent and 
to forego the incremental path to independence as a high school 
and college student focusing on studies and extracurricular 
activities. The decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment is a 
decision to choose a certain quality of life over length of life, 
and may reflect deeper values such as bodily integrity, dignity, 
and core religious tenets. The decision to choose to change 
gender identity—to choose to be male or female—is a life-
altering choice especially in a society that places great value on 
gender distinctions.  
The controversial and important decision regarding the 
genetic testing of minors for adult-onset diseases (such as breast 
cancer or Alzheimer’s disease) affects a minor’s identity and is 
worth highlighting.75 Who should decide whether minors should 
be tested for a predisposition to a serious, chronic, or terminal 
disease that may not manifest itself until late adulthood (if at 
all)?76 This tension becomes a conflict when a parent wants the 
                                                          
74 Id. at 790, 800; see Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open 
Future, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND 
STATE POWER 124, 138–51 (William Aiken & Hugh Lafollette, eds., 1980). 
To preserve the child’s future, it is important to keep options open that would 
be foreclosed in adulthood—such as parenthood, gender identity, and quality 
of life.  
75 See generally Rhodes, supra note 15; Stephen Robertson & Julian 
Savulescu, Is There a Case in Favour of Predictive Genetic Testing in Young 
Children?, 15 BIOETHICS 26 (2001) (all sources confronting the issue of 
predictive genetic testing in young children); Benjamin Wilfond & Lainie 
Friedman Ross, From Genetics to Genomics: Ethics, Policy and Parental 
Decision-Making, 34 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 639 (2009). 
76 For a discussion of this issue, see Am. Coll. of Med. Genetics, supra 
note 15; Rhodes, supra note 15; Robertson & Savulescu, supra note 75; 
Wilfond & Ross, supra note 75; see also Beth N. Peshkin et al., Brief 
Assessment of Parents’ Attitudes Toward Testing Minor Children for 
Hereditary Breast/Ovarian Cancer Genes: Development and Validation of the 
Pediatric BRCA ½ Testing Attitudes Scale (P-TAS), 34 J. PEDIATRIC 
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minor to be tested and the minor wants to refuse the testing: 
should he or she be able to veto the parents’ decision and 
prevent the violation of bodily integrity and breach of privacy?77 
The implications of the testing and the knowledge gained from it 
implicate core values and may affect the quality of the minor’s 
entire life. For example, the testing and knowledge may have 
psychological effects, as an individual will need to deal with the 
anxiety and related emotions that may be caused by the acquired 
knowledge of one’s predisposition to a serious disease that may 
already have caused death in the family.78 It also may affect the 
health care received (including further testing and other 
surveillance), childbearing decisions, and other “life planning.”79  
For all of these reasons, this testing decision is identity-forming 
and mature minors need to be able to participate significantly in the 
decision.80 At a minimum, minors with capacity to make this health 
care decision should be able to veto the parents’ decision to compel 
testing and knowledge acquisition. The mature minor should be 
able to guide the quality of his or her life, and make a decision to 
test when he or she is ready in all respects.81  
                                                          
PSYCHOL. 627, 628 (2009). 
77 See Anne Marie Laberge & Wylie Burke, Testing Minors for Breast 
Cancer, 9 VIRTUAL MENTOR 6, 8 (2007) (discussing the potential 
consequences of honoring autonomous parental decisions). 
78 See, e.g., Am. Coll. of Med. Genetics, supra note 15, at 1233, 1235–
36; Rhodes, supra note 15, at 612–15; Robertson & Savulescu, supra note 
75, at 34, 45. 
79 See Am. Coll. of Med. Genetics, supra note 15, at 1233–37; cf. 
Angela Bradbury et al., Should Genetic Testing for BRCA ½ be Permitted for 
Minors? Opinions of BRCA Mutation Carriers and Their Adult Offspring, 
AM. J. MED. GENETICS 70, 74 (2008) (providing evidence that the most 
common reason to support testing was to foster healthy behavior in minors, 
and in parents encouraging minors’ healthy behavior).   
80 See Robertson & Savulescu, supra note 75, at 40 (“Learning to 
become autonomous requires actually making important decisions for oneself 
about oneself, and one such decision might be whether to know some fact 
about one’s genetic make-up.”); see also Bradbury et al., supra note 79, at 
76 (“Given that some individuals achieve social, emotional and intellectual 
maturity well in advance of their peers, it may be permissible to allow 
genetic testing of minors on a case-by-case basis.”). 
81 See Peshkin et al., supra note 76, at 628 (citing, inter alia, Am. Coll. 
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B. Promoting Moral Development  
Respecting mature minors’ decisions in certain health care 
decisions not only will allow them to chart their own futures, but 
also assist in developing independent decision-making skills and 
promoting moral development. One such type of decision is 
giving informed consent to research. Allowing mature minors to 
consent to nontherapeutic research will encourage them to develop 
values such as altruism, as well as to better assess the risks and 
benefits of a clinical trial.82 
In 2004, the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) issued a 
comprehensive report relating to children’s participation in 
research trials, which furthers this model of decision making for 
adolescents: 
Institutional review boards should consider granting  
waivers of parental permission for adolescent participation 
in research when 
 the research is important to the health and well-
being of adolescents and it cannot reasonably or 
practically be carried out without the waiver. . . or 
 the research involves treatments that state laws 
permit adolescents to receive without parental 
permission (consistent with the definition of 
children in the [federal regulations]); 
                                                          
of Med. Genetics, supra note 15; Bradbury et al., supra note 79) (discussing 
case-by-case approach, considering minor’s maturity). 
82 See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD., supra note 17, at 7; cf. 
Rhonda Gay Hartman, Gault’s Legacy: Dignity, Due Process and 
Adolescents’ Liberty Interests in Living Donation, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 67, 103–06 (2008) (furthering similar values in organ 
donation context); Hartman, Word from the Academies, supra note 17, at 
169–70 (crediting the numerous benefits of autonomous decisions to 
participate in research); Rosato, The Ethics of Clinical Trials, supra note 34, 
at 370 (stating that empowerment of mature minors “would lead to a number 
of desirable results, including adolescents being more informed about these 
decisions; being allowed to practice decision making before formal adulthood 
begins, thus permitting them to become better decision makers in adulthood; 
and being able to play a role in shaping their own identities, including their 
desire to be beneficent.”). 
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and when 
 the investigator has presented evidence that the 
adolescents are capable of understanding the 
research and their rights as research participants 
and 
 the research protocol includes appropriate 
safeguards to protect the interests of the 
adolescent consistent with the risk presented by 
the research.83 
The policy should not be limited to treatments that state laws 
permit adolescents to receive without parental permission, since 
those laws may be limited.84 Also, the standard should clearly 
allow mature minors to consent to nontherapeutic research if it 
poses only a minimal risk.85 
This approach appropriately balances the relevant public 
policies, including respect for the child’s bodily integrity, 
autonomy, and dignity; protection of the child’s health; and the 
societal benefit of the knowledge gained through the research. 
As an additional benefit, allowing minors to make these kinds of 
decisions may also enable them to accelerate their brain 
development, since there is support for the conclusion that 
greater use of their decision-making capacities may increase 
those capacities.86 
                                                          
83 INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD., supra note 17, at 19; accord 
Hartman, Word from the Academies, supra note 17, at 197–99 (advocating 
for legal reform and further research consistent with the IOM’s 
recommendations); Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 800–01 
(proposing similar approach). 
84 See supra Part II. 
85 See Rosato, The Ethics of Clinical Trials, supra note 34, at 370–71. In 
the federal regulations, “minimal risk” is defined as “the probability and 
magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in 
and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the 
performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests.” 45 
C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (2010); 21 C.F.R. § 50.3(k) (2011); see also INST. OF 
MED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD., supra note 17, at 117–36 (discussing 
interpretations of minimal risk and recommendations related to risk). 
86 See Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 792–93; see also 
Steinberg, Cognitive Development, supra note 51, at 71 (“Performance in 
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C. Parity  
Similar kinds of decisions should be regarded as similar so 
that the minor’s autonomy is truly respected.  For example, an 
adolescent who becomes a parent should be able to make health 
care decisions for herself and for her child;87 and a minor who 
makes decisions regarding sexually transmitted diseases should 
be able to consent to the HPV vaccine, which prevents certain 
cancers caused by the Human Papillomavirus.88 
Access to the HPV vaccine is a cutting-edge issue that 
illustrates an existing lack of parity among decisions related to 
sexually transmitted diseases. Adolescents seek the HPV vaccine 
and may not be able to get it, and other adolescents who need it 
may not know about the vaccine or how to ask for it.89 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether state laws allow this decision to 
be made without notifying or seeking the consent of a parent, even if 
the law allows for treatment of STDs.90 If the vaccine is considered 
general health care, parental involvement is required. Under this 
paradigm, without parity, a sexually active teen can get a pregnancy 
                                                          
everyday settings are likely affected by emotional states, social influences and 
expertise.”); cf. Hartman, Word from the Academies, supra note 17, at 169–
70 (developing cognitive abilities, improving self-image, enhancing sense of 
identity and accomplishment). See generally INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L 
ACAD., supra note 17, at 179 (cognitive development depends in part on 
experience and training). 
87 For a discussion of this issue, see Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 
12, at 777–78. 
88 See sources cited supra note 14. 
89 See Farrell & Rome, supra note 14, at 435–36; Ford et al., supra note 
14, at 570–71; Saribel G. Ceballos, HPV Vaccination for Adolescents; An 
Ethics Case Study, ADVANCE FOR NPS & PAS, Oct. 26, 2009, at 31, 
available at http://nurse-practitioners-and-physician-assistants.advanceweb. 
com/Article/HPV-Vaccination-for-Adolescents.aspx; Cynthia S. Marietta, 
High Incidence of HPV in Minors Spotlights Need for State Legislators to 
Consider Amending Child “Consent to Treatment” Laws, HEALTH L. PERSP. 
6 (May 21, 2010, 8:23 AM), http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/ 
2010/(CM)%20HPV.pdf. 
90 See English et al., supra note 14, at S86–87; Ford et al., supra note 
14, at 570. A few state laws appear to allow minor consent to vaccination. 
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.5 (West 2008 & Supp. 2010). 
 What Are the Implications? 187 
 
test or whatever medication is necessary to treat a sexually 
transmitted disease, but cannot get a vaccination to prevent some of 
the most serious, long-term health consequences of contracting one 
of the most prevalent sexually transmitted diseases.91 
The HPV vaccine should be given without the need for 
parental consent or permission, as it should be regarded as a 
decision involving the transmission of sexually transmitted 
diseases.92 State laws should be changed to allow minors to 
consent to this treatment, which affects their long-term health, in 
determining whether it will increase the probability of serious 
conditions.93 In addition, parental consent waivers to treatment 
should clearly include preventative treatment such as 
vaccinations.94 Preserving this parity with STD treatment will 
best protect the minor’s autonomy and health. 
D. Public Health  
The law has given some deference to minors in areas 
implicating public health concerns. These areas of decision 
making include mental health, drug and alcohol treatment, birth 
control, and treatment for STDs.95 These areas address a number 
of important public health concerns, including preventing the 
                                                          
91 See Farrell & Rome, supra note 14, at 436; Marietta, supra note 89, 
at 6–7; cf. English et al., supra note 14, at S87 (describing how laws could 
include vaccinations). 
92 See Farrell & Rome, supra note 14, at 436. 
93 For example, a state could enact a law that allows minors to consent to 
vaccination as health care related to the prevention of STDs. See N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 90-21.5 (West 2008 & Supp. 2010); see also S. 4779, 231st 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009), http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/ 
bill/S4779-2009 (the language of the bill reads, “A health care practitioner 
may provide health care related to the prevention of a sexually transmissible 
disease, including administering vaccines, to a person under the age of 
eighteen years without the consent or knowledge of the parents or guardians 
of such person, provided that the person has capacity to consent to the care, 
without regard to the person’s age, and the person consents.”).   
94 See Ford et al., supra note 14, at 572–73. 
95 See supra Part III. The area of decisional autonomy may also include 
the HPV vaccination. See Farrell & Rome, supra note 14, at 436–37. 
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spread of communicable diseases and ensuring that the minor 
obtains needed treatment to prevent serious harm to herself or to 
others. In these contexts, the safety of the minor and the 
community is more important than ensuring that parents know 
about or are involved in the decisions.96 For example, we do not 
want to deter teens from obtaining medication to treat an STD 
because they do not want to tell their parents they have been 
sexually active (probably without protection) and caught a disease 
as a result. 
Although these areas of decision-making authority are already 
recognized by most states,97 they should be expanded as necessary 
to protect against the dangers that teenagers pose to themselves 
and to others.98 For example, as discussed above, the minors’ 
right to obtain treatment for STDs should include the right to 
consent to the HPV vaccine. In addition, statutes relating to 
minors’ consent to mental health treatment need to better reflect 
the reality of their lives, including the deterrent effect that 
parental involvement may have on seeking needed treatment. A 
recent California mental health statute99 seems to go only halfway: 
it recognizes a mature minor doctrine for outpatient mental health 
services,100 but then requires that a parent or guardian be involved 
unless the involvement would be “inappropriate” and requires 
parental contact to be recorded.101 True autonomy for minors 
considered mature should not require parental involvement or 
proof that it is inappropriate. The fact that the mature minor is 
seeking mental health treatment on his or her own without an 
                                                          
96 See Halpern-Felsher & Cauffman, supra note 51, at 271–72 
(suggesting treatment for STDs despite adolescents’ immaturity). 
97 See supra Part II. 
98 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124260 (West Supp. 2011) (adopting 
mature minor doctrine, but significantly limiting it with requirement of 
parental involvement). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. See generally Sana Loue, Faith-Based Mental Health Treatment of 
Minors, 31 J. LEGAL. MED. 171, 195 (2010) (“A number of states . . . currently 
provide for minors’ access to mental health services absent parental consent 
and notification, subject to various restrictions relating to the nature and 
duration of treatment.”). 
101 Loue, supra note 100. 
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adult involved should be enough of an indication that the minor 
would not desire nor benefit from consultation with a parent. 
Recognizing these compelling public policies and “privatizing” 
the law as much as possible would only build respect for the 
adolescents’ dignity and right to self-determination.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The recent scientific literature on adolescent brain 
development should not dictate the development of the law,102 
even if it is consistent with the “commonsense reality” that teens 
have a lot of growing up to do. We know teenagers who are as 
capable, or more capable, than some adults. Even as teens, they 
raise healthy children, have successful careers, and make other 
important decisions on their own. For those minors who are 
deemed mature enough to make a decision in a particular 
context, compelling pubic policies suggest that we should give 
their voices recognition, and give their choices the dignity and 
respect that they deserve.103  
                                                          
102 Steinberg, Public Policy, supra note 9, at 746–48. 
103 See Hartman, supra note 82 (proposing that, consistent with Gault, 
minors should be allowed to consent to organ donation to protect their 
dignity); cf. Sanger, supra note 40 (arguing that abortion bypass hearings fail 
to respect the dignity of minors).  
